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The subtitle of Gareth Stedman Jones’ recent biography of Marx appears to offer a 
dialectical inquiry in the grand tradition of Peter Abelard, Sic et Non; how was Marx great and of 
what illusions was he guilty? Which is to say, what in Marx is to be affirmed and what denied? 
Given Stedman Jones’ deep yet critical engagement with the Marxist tradition, one might 
anticipate a deeply reflective and thoughtful effort to determine what is living and what is dead 
in Marx’s work. Unfortunately, this book, ambitious as it is, falls well short of such expectations.  
It is a comprehensive work of biography in that grand British tradition that encompasses life and 
times as well as a sophisticated account of the intellectual progress of the subject.  But there are 
far better works of this type on Marx by McLellan (Karl Marx: A Biography Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006) and more recently Wheen (Karl Marx: A Life, W.W. Norton, 2001). As for 
dialectical critique, Heilbroner’s Marxism: For and Against (W.W. Norton, 1980), remains a 
succinct and still highly relevant standard.  
Compared to Stedman Jones’ previous work on Engels, Lukács, and his very notable 
work on the language of class in nineteenth and twentieth century England, this offering falls 
well short of his best standards. The flaw is not in the research, which is as thorough as ever. Nor 
is it stylistic. The book is quite readable, although the author for reasons unspecified decided to 
call Marx by his first name throughout the book and so it is that “Karl” reads Hegel, “Karl” 
criticizes Proudhon, “Karl” collaborates with Engels, and if Stedman Jones is to be believed, 
“Karl’s” financial dependency on Engels inhibits the late development of his thought in 
unorthodox directions. The latter assertion is not supported from the primary sources, which is 
not to say it is impossible, simply that it is supposition and if it were true, it would not fit the 
rubric of “Illusion” offered in the title.  Indeed, at the end of the work one is left uncertain as 
how Stedman Jones thinks Marx was great, nor what were his most notable illusions. Nor is there 
any clear statement as to how, if at all, Marx’s thought remains living or not.  
 Stedman Jones is a scholar of Marx and Marxism and has also produced a rich body of 
historical class analysis, but that said it should be noted that he does not write from what some 
would regard as a Marxist perspective. Indeed, some reviewers reject this book and have also 
sharply criticized his work on labor history for its utilization of a framework drawn from 
semiotics and discourse theory. Stedman Jones should, however, be considered from the 
perspective he has. It is the very fact that he has but one foot in the Marxist tradition that seemed 
to offer the prospect that he could have produced a sympathetic yet critically worthwhile 
biography of Marx. This work does not rely in any apparent way on Stedman Jones’ previous 
work and interest in the relationship between language and class. Indeed, one area where one 
might expect to find Stedman Jones working from a position of strength would be in the 
discussion of ideology, which is remarkably largely limited to the footnotes, where Stedman 
Jones summarizes recent scholarship that has demonstrated that the text of “German Ideology” 
as we now know it, is a pastiche of unpublished manuscripts put together by early Soviet era 
editors. Citations to such recent scholarship does indeed belong in the notes but the fact remains 
that Marx did have some intriguing things to say about language in those texts as well as 
elsewhere in his work.  
          One area where Stedman Jones does make a notable contribution is in drawing attention 
the influence of the German Historical School of Jurisprudence of Karl von Savigny in both the 
early as well as later developments of Marx’s thought.  According to Stedman Jones, this 
conservative body of scholarship provided a foil against which Hegelian, especially left-Hegelian 
thinkers developed their critical views of property, religion, and the state in the 1830’s and ‘40’s.  
Later, Stedman Jones comes back to this body of work and traces its connection to the 
development of nineteenth century anthropology’s investigations into ancient communal forms 
of land ownership. This work had inspired Marx to reconsider the socialist potentiality of the 
Russian peasant commune and, according to Stedman Jones, contributed to a gap between the 
later Marx and Engels, the latter of whom was in Stedman Jones’ view concerned by then to 
codify an orthodox Marxism that featured a linear view of historical progression of modes of 
production.  The problem here, however, is that Stedman Jones does not discuss the extent to 
which this same body of anthropological literature influences Engels’ own Origin of the Family, 
Private Property, and the State which quite notably discusses pre-capitalist forms of communal 
ownership. 
 Throughout much of the middle to later portions of the work, Stedman Jones emphasizes 
and re-emphasizes Marx’s failure to complete Capital, which he clearly regards as a flawed work 
but does not quite identify how or why. Marx’s medical problems that certainly affected the 
productivity of his middle to later years are discussed in detail, although the psychological 
impact of exile and poverty are only hinted at by Stedman Jones.  He reads Marx’s opus as 
following a Hegelian logic, an interpretation with which this reviewer does not quarrel, with 
which the sources and materials Marx was working would finally not conform. One has the sense 
though that Stedman Jones is not putting all his cards on the table here and so we are left untold 
as to just what is the “illusion” from which Marx suffered?  The inevitable collapse of 
capitalism? The falling rate of profit? The labor theory of value? Or, was the original sin of 
illusion in the Hegelian method? Of course, all of the above have been put forth by many 
commentators and critics as flaws in Marx’s theoretical framework and one might consider so 
long as Marx remains a relevant thinker. Indeed, in today’s world that is hard to deny, so that 
even well-known critical debates may well be worth returning to again, but here at least it seems 
Stedman Jones could have said more.   
 
  
